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I. INTRODUCTION
With guns drawn, police officers storm into a hotel room, spot
drugs in plain view on the coffee table, and then arrest the occupant. But
the officers lack probable cause. Under the Fourth Amendment, whether
the occupant of the illegally-searched hotel room can suppress the
evidence depends on his or her expectation of privacy in the room.1 This
ability to challenge the search, also known as “standing,” might depend
on how the occupant obtained the hotel room and what he or she is doing
there. Cases have examined rooms registered under an alias,2 registered
†
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1 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998).
2
United States v. Domenech, 623 F.3d 325, 328 (6th Cir. 2010). The author served
as a law clerk to a judge on the Domenech panel.. As this Article was going to print the
panel vacated the original opinion, which discussed expectation of privacy issues, and
instead resolved the appeal based on exigent circumstances without reaching the
expectation-of-privacy question. United States v. Domenech, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS
14452, at *8 (6th Cir. July 12, 2011). Although no longer law, this Article continues to
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to a third party,3 procured by an agent,4 and obtained with a fraudulent
credit card.5 Guests have stayed a little past the checkout time,6 and well
past the checkout time,7 at hotels with lax checkout policies,8 and at
hotels with strict policies.9 The expectation of privacy differs for visitors
who use a room only to party or to process drugs,10 and the privacy
expectation might change based on length of occupancy—courts have
distinguished between the boyfriend of the person who rented the hotel
staying overnight and a room used temporarily by a prostitute plying her
trade.11
The Supreme Court has stated that “the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places.”12 However, the Court has conditioned this statement
by stating that “the extent to which the Fourth Amendment protects
people may depend upon where those people are.”13 Specifically, “an
overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth
Amendment,”14 but those “essentially present for a business transaction”
cannot.15 The Court has also said that what is “permitted by society” will
determine the legitimacy of a Fourth Amendment expectation of
privacy,16 but lower courts do not always agree on exactly what society
allows.
A possible circuit split is evolving on the issue, with the Tenth
Circuit requiring a defendant to “demonstrate that the room was
registered to him,”17 and the Sixth Circuit holding that an invalid hotel

cite to the original opinion because it is the most recent discussion of some of the issues
presented and its analysis remains persuasive. At least one judge continues to consider it
correct. Id. at * 18.
3 United States v. Rollins, No. 2:04CR747 TC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43849, at
*12 (D. Utah July 18, 2005) (guest of registered guest).
4 United States v. Lyons, 706 F.2d 321, 324 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
5 United States v. Cunag, 386 F.3d 888, 895 (9th Cir. 2004).
6 United States v. Dorais, 241 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 2001); see also United
States v. Wai-Keung, 845 F. Supp. 1548, 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (search after expiration of
late checkout period was valid).
7 United States v. Watson, 783 F. Supp. 258, 259 (E.D. Va. 1992).
8 Id. at 259–63.
9 United States v. Kitchens, 114 F.3d 29, 32 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he manager of the
motel testified that the motel had a strict policy regarding check out.”).
10 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998).
11 United States v. Conway, 854 F. Supp. 834, 838 (D. Kan. 1994) (no expectation of
privacy by visitor to room using it only to have sex).
12 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
13 Carter, 525 U.S. at 88.
14 Id. at 90.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 88 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
17 United States v. Carr, 939 F.2d 1442, 1446 (10th Cir. 1991).
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registration is a legal concern “only” to the hotel.18 If a defendant cannot
challenge an illegal search because of invalid registration, then invalid
registration (for whatever reason) can provide an after-the-fact
justification for an illegal search. Hotel rooms pose interesting problems,
but ultimately the expectation of privacy in hotels should be measured in
the same way that the Fourth Amendment deals with other types of
residences. This Article analyzes some distinct problems faced in hotel
rooms, including invalid registrations, guests of guests, and guests who
stay beyond the rental period, and proposes that courts apply a universal
rule that requires the hotel to act first to terminate the expectation of
privacy of a guest who violates hotel policy.
II. HOTEL PRIVACY ISSUES
A. Hotels and the Fourth Amendment
In general, the Fourth Amendment “requires police officers to
obtain a warrant before searching or seizing persons, houses, papers, and
effects.”19 Courts have held that “this constitutional protection also
applies to hotel rooms.”20 However, before being able to suppress the
results of an illegal search, a defendant must meet his burden of showing
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room.21 This is done by
establishing a subjective expectation of privacy in the place searched and
society’s willingness to accept the reasonableness of this expectation.22
Thus, a hotel room, as “a temporary abode,” receives the same Fourth
Amendment protections as a home,23 because the occupant of a hotel

18 United States v. Domenech, 623 F.3d 325, 330 (6th Cir. 2010). The risk of a split
was alleviated when the Sixth Circuit replaced the original opinion, which dealt with
expectation of privacy issues, and replaced it with one deciding the case based on exigent
circumstances. See United States v. Domenech, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14452, at *8 (6th
Cir. July 12, 2011).
19 United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 698 (6th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
20 See, e.g., id. (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966); Stoner v.
California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964)).
21 See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 132 n.1 (1978) (“The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of
establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged
search or seizure.”).
22 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998).
23 United States v. Singleton, 922 F. Supp. 1522, 1527 (D. Kan. 1996) (citing Hoffa,
385 U.S. at 301; United States v. Foxworth, 8 F.3d 540, 544 (7th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Richard, 994 F.2d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Parizo, 514 F.2d
52, 54 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Croft, 429 F.2d 884, 887 (10th Cir. 1970)).
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room has an expectation of privacy “no less than a tenant of a house, or
the occupant of a room in a boarding house.”24
It makes sense to apply the same legal test to hotels as to
apartments or homes, rather than assigning a lesser degree of privacy.25
Not all hotels are as nice as a Hilton—drawing a line between a weekly
or monthly-rate hotel and a month-by-month apartment lease can be
difficult,26 and deciding that an individual’s constitutional rights depend
on that determination would be absurd.
Hotel guests may face the same Fourth Amendment privacy
problems as apartment tenants. Occupants of a hotel room, for example,
might not be able to reasonably assume that someone in an adjoining
room or in the hall cannot hear their conversations,27 but an apartment
dweller with thin walls might face the same problem. Hotel guests retain
no expectation of privacy in the hotel’s guest registration records,28 in the
same way that apartment renters often have their names on a list at the
management office and homeowners provide information to mortgageholders.29 Homeowners, like apartment dwellers,30 also cannot expect
privacy in the parking lot.31 The expectation of privacy question
becomes complicated when a guest occupies a room in violation of some
hotel policy, such as under an invalid registration card.32

24

Stoner, 376 U.S. at 490.
Guests in other countries might not enjoy the kind of privacy that Americans do in
hotel rooms. See Harvey Riskikof, Combating Terrorism in the Digital Age: A Clash of
Doctrines, 78 MISS. L.J. 381, 413 (stating that in other countries hotel rooms are regularly
searched and hotel phone networks monitored).
26 See United States v. Kimber, 395 Fed.App’x. 237 (6th Cir. 2010) (per curium)
(regarding a former hotel converted into a residential apartment building).
27 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 73 (2010) (citing United States v.
Agapito, 620 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1980)); Jon Sands and Shawdy Banihashemi, Heartbreak
Hotel and the Fourth Amendment: A Motel Graphic, CHAMPION, Oct. 2008, at 22–23
(2008) (citing United States v. Llanes, 398 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1968)).
28 68 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 27, § 73 (citing United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d
1103 (9th Cir. 2000)).
29 Kostrikin v. United States, CV-F-99-6732, 1999 WL 1424991, at *2 (E.D. Cal.
Dec. 17, 1999) (no expectation of privacy in mortgage records held by third party).
30 Lease v. Tyler, No. 1:05-CV-618, 2008 WL 2673381, at *6 (M.D. PA. June 30,
2008) (“Because of the number of residents and guests visiting a multiple-occupancy
residence, some courts have reasoned that there is ‘no justified expectation of privacy as
to a portion of the home which all residents and visitors must use to enter, the common
yard open to the public, or the parking lot open to all users of the apartment building.’”)
(quoting WAYNE LAFAVE, 1 SEARCH & SEIZURE § 2.3(f)).
31 United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 1994).
32 United States v. Domenech, 623 F.3d 325, 330 (6th Cir. 2010).
25
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B. Invalid Registration: Aliases, Agents, and the Like
Hotels of ill repute may draw a law enforcement presence, if only to
cruise the parking lot to run license plates.33 However, once a police
officer is able to enter a room, she might find drugs or weapons in plain
view.34 The Sixth Circuit dealt with several hotel privacy issues
resulting from exactly this type of law enforcement investigation in a
recent case, United States v. Domenech, where a divided panel found an
expectation of privacy in a hotel room rented by a man using a fake
name.35 After noticing suspicious activity and fearing that evidence
might be destroyed, officers entered the room without a warrant and
found two brothers, Alejandro and William Domenech, with contraband
and two female companions.36 The case was a procedural mess,37
coming into federal court “[a]fter a state court suppressed the evidence
found in the room as the result of an illegal search.”38 The government
argued that the brothers lacked an expectation of privacy because they
failed to prove that they were either the registrants of the room or were
sharing the room with someone who was such a registrant. The room
was, in fact, rented under an alias by “[a] man who called himself
‘Rogelio’ [who] filled out a registration card later described by officers
as ‘full of nonsense.’”39 The Domenech brothers could not demonstrate
33
34

2001).
35

See, e.g., id. at 327; United States v. Barnum, 564 F.3d 964, 967 (8th Cir. 2009).
Domenech, 623 F.3d at 327; United States v. Dorais, 241 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir.

Domenech, 623 F.3d at 330.
The room initially drew the attention of officers who ran the plates of the cars in
the parking lot and found one belonging to a parole absconder, which the occupants were
borrowing. United States v. Domenech, No. 1:06:CR:245, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25758, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 6, 2007). The Sixth Circuit recounts the following
events:
Two sheriff’s deputies knocked on the door while Trooper Burchell
from the state police went around behind the motel room and
stationed himself behind the closed, frosted bathroom window of
Room 22. When the officers knocked on the front door, Burchell saw
the light turn on and observed a figure enter the room and lean over;
but the frosted window prevented him from actually seeing any
fixtures or the person in the bathroom. Expecting (correctly) that the
person in the bathroom was about to flush away evidence, Burchell
opened the window and swung his flashlight at Alejandro. The
commotion prompted the officers at the front of the motel room to
burst through the door and to find Alejandro and his brother William
with two women, drugs, guns, and counterfeit currency.
Domenech, 623 F.3d at 327.
37 The briefing also addressed procedural irregularities (problems with counsel) that
the defendants alleged prevented them from testifying at the sentencing hearing, but these
issues were conceded as moot at oral argument. Id. at 328 n.1.
38 Id. at 328.
39 Domenech, 623 F.3d at 327.
36
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that they were registered to the room or that they were the guests of
Rogelio.40 However, they did prove the following: 1) Alejandro paid for
the rooms; 2) Alejandro directed Rogelio to rent the rooms for the group;
3) the group spent the previous night at the hotel before switching rooms;
4) Room 22 was for William and 31 for Alejandro; 5) the entire party
was in Room 22 at the time of arrest; 6) the Domenech brothers were in a
state of undress when the police arrived; and 7) the brothers were
undressed, possessed the room key, and had luggage in the room at the
time the police arrived.41 The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court,
finding the defendants’ agent’s use of an alias, and the resulting invalid
hotel registration, did not eliminate the defendants’ expectations of
privacy.42
The Court recognized that if “the Domenech brothers rented Room
22 under their own name, they unquestionably would possess a legally
cognizable expectation of privacy.”43 Using an agent did not change this
because a person can reasonably expect to have privacy in a room
provided by another.44 This appears perfectly reasonable as our society
expects that certain individuals, such as travelling business executives,
celebrities, or political leaders, often have an agent or employee obtain
their rooms, but fully expect privacy in their room. What complicated
the situation in Domenech was the fact that Rogelio was not the agent’s
real name.45
The Sixth Circuit rejected the claim “that the agent’s use of an alias
forecloses the Domenech brothers from holding any reasonable privacy
expectations.”46 Reviewing cases from the Eleventh,47 Fifth,48 Seventh,49
and Eighth Circuits,50 the Sixth Circuit found that one could retain an

40 United States v. Domenech, No. 1:06:CR:245, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25758, at
*8–12 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 6, 2007).
41 Domenech, 623 F.3d at 328.
42 Id. at 329.
43 Id.
44 Id. (citing United States v. Lyons 706 F.2d 321, 324 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
45 Id. at 327 (stating registration card was “full of nonsense”).
46 Id. at 329.
47 United States v. Newbern, 731 F.2d 744, 748 (11th Cir. 1984) (recognizing a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room registered under an alias).
48 United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770, 774 (5th Cir. 1992) (packages delivered
under fictitious name); United States v. Richards, 638 F.2d 765, 770 (5th Cir. 1981)
(packages).
49 United States v. Pitts, 322 F.3d 449, 457–59 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he expectation of
privacy for a person using an alias in sending or receiving mail is one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable.”).
50 United States v. Watson, 950 F.2d 505, 507 (8th Cir. 1991) (defendant possessed
expectation of privacy in house purchased under an alias).

2011]

DO NOT DISTURB

275

expectation of privacy in a hotel room registered under an alias.51 Even
if “rental through an alias militates against deeming the occupant’s
expectation of privacy legitimate,” the “specific factual setting” in the
case protected the expectation.52 The Sixth Circuit addressed the alias
issue as a part of the broader question: whether the district court was
correct to apply “the registration-required-for-privacy rule.”53 In this
regard, the Sixth Circuit faced a potential conflict with the Tenth
Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Carr.54
Like Domenech, Carr involved an odd procedural posture.55 Also,
as in Domenech, the defendant in Carr stayed in a hotel room illicitly
and thus could not meet the court’s requirement that he “demonstrate that
the room was registered to him . . . or that he was sharing it with
someone to whom the room was registered.”56 But the Sixth Circuit
rejected the legal significance the Tenth Circuit attached to hotel
registration in Carr, concluding that: “Only to the motel is the Domenech
brothers’ invalid registration a legal concern.”57 This conclusion relied
on a number of cases that required an owner to act first to terminate an
illegal renter’s possession.58
Rather than reading Carr as “espousing the registration-requiredfor-privacy rule applied by the district court,” the Sixth Circuit focused
on language in Carr explaining that “[i]mportant considerations in the
expectation of privacy equation include ownership, lawful possession or

51

Domenech, 623 F.3d at 330.
Id. The court did note that dicta in United States v. Bruce, 396 F.3d 697, 709 n.7
(6th Cir. 2005), vacated on other grounds, United States v. Bruce, 405 F.3d 1034, 1035
(6th Cir. 2005), treated the use of an alias as weighing against the legitimacy of an
expectation of privacy. Id.
53 Id.
54 939 F.2d 1442, 1446–49 (10th Cir. 1991).
55 As the Sixth Circuit explained: “In Carr, after the defendant failed to present any
evidence to establish his expectation of privacy, the district court denied his motion to
suppress, citing the failure of proof. The defendant sought to remedy the evidentiary
shortcoming later with an affidavit. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s refusal
to consider the affidavit, but went on—obviously in dicta—” to discuss the merits of the
expectation of privacy under the affidavit. Domenech, 623 F.3d at 329.
56 Carr, 939 F.2d at 1446.
57 Domenech, 623 F.3d at 330.
58 Id. (citing United States v. Cunag, 386 F.3d 888, 895 (9th Cir. 2004) (occupant of
fraudulently obtained hotel room had expectation of privacy until hotel took affirmative
steps to repossess the room); see also United States v. Washington, 573 F.3d 279, 284–85
(6th Cir. 2009) (apartment tenant in violation of lease maintained expectation of privacy
because landlord did not evict him); United States v. McClendon, 86 F. App’x 92, 95–96
(6th Cir. 2004) (invalid sublet in violation of lease insufficient to render expectation
unreasonable); United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir. 1997) (occupant with
insufficient funds possessed expectation of privacy until locked out).
52
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lawful control of the premises searched.”59 These widely accepted
factors60 emerged from the Supreme Court’s decision in Rakas v.
Illinois,61 and the Sixth Circuit applied them to the facts of the case to
find an expectation of privacy. The Sixth Circuit said that “[t]he
Domenech brothers demonstrated lawful control/possession with
evidence that they procured the room for their own use through their
agent, paid for the room, possessed the key to the room, and occupied it
both physically and with belongings.”62 Moreover, because the hotel
“accepted a registration card ‘full of nonsense’ for two rooms from an
individual acting for someone else who admitted that others would stay
with him . . . the Domenech brothers exercised control over Room 22
with this de facto permission of the motel.”63 De facto permission from
the motel, which had not been withdrawn, was enough to establish lawful
control/possession and thus a reasonable expectation of privacy enabling
the defendants to challenge the search.64
The Sixth Circuit’s approach in Domenech better comports with the
“understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.”65
Whenever a hotel guest fails to fill out a registration card, or registers
using false information, she possesses an invalid registration and cannot
necessarily meet the Tenth Circuit’s requirements to demonstrate that the
room was registered to her or that she was sharing it with a registered
guest. While “most hotel guests formally register,”66 at least some do
not, or do so under fictitious names.67 While this renders the registration
invalid, their expectation of privacy remains intact.68

59

Domenech, 623 F.3d at 330 (quoting Carr, 939 F.2d at 1446).
See, e.g., United States v. McRae, 156 F.3d 708, 711 (6th Cir. 1998) (relying on
Carr’s list of considerations); see also United States v. Gale, 136 F.3d 192, 195–96 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (defendant who changed the locks to an apartment rented to another and
proceeded to use the apartment for the purpose of packaging drugs had no legitimate
expectation of privacy in the apartment because he did not have legal authority to be
there).
61 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
62 Domenech, 623 F.3d at 330.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12.
66 State v. Sletten, 664 N.W.2d 870, 877 (Minn. App. 2003).
67 See United States v. Watson, 783 F. Supp. 258, 259 (E.D. Va. 1992) (noting
without comment that defendant had rented room under a pseudonym); see also United
States v. McConnell, 903 F.2d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1990) (same).
68 See Moberg v. State, 810 S.W.2d 190, 194 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (“[T]he
appellant in this particular case registered under an alias, we fail to perceive how that
standing alone diminished appellant’s expectation of privacy in the room he had let.”); 68
AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 27, § 73 (treating use of alias as acceptable).
60
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Society recognizes that a person expects privacy in a hotel room
registered under a fake name and, in fact, may enjoy a greater degree of
privacy. This might explain why celebrities do so. Matt Damon, for
example, checked into the Mayfair Hotel in London as Arthur Ripley, the
name of his character from the movie The Talented Mr. Ripley,69 while
English celebrity Cheryl Cole used the fake name Lily English in Los
Angeles.70 Aside from celebrities, one can imagine many situations
where a person might use a false name (and a correspondingly invalid
registration) to secure additional privacy: a battered woman fleeing an
abusive husband, an informant enrolled in the witness protection
program, or even adulterous lovers hiding from their spouses.71 The
Sixth Circuit properly rejected the argument that criminal behavior
precludes a defendant from sharing the benefit of privacy that society
understands as attaching when registering under an alias.72 Moreover,
the Sixth Circuit’s approach puts more emphasis on the will of the
property owner by finding de facto permission on the facts of the case
and relying on cases that require management to act first to eliminate an
expectation of privacy rather than by over-emphasizing the legal
significance of the registration process.
69 Matt
Damon Uses Fairly Unoriginal Fake Name at London Hotel,
HOTELCHATTER.COM (Apr. 15, 2008, 4:42:00 PM), http://www.hotelchatter.com/
story/2008/4/15/163527/987/hotels/Matt_Damon_Uses_Fairly_Unoriginal_Fake_Name_
at_London_Hotel; Matt’s Secret Hotel Name, THE DAILY STAR, Apr. 13, 2008, available
at http://www.dailystar.co.uk/thebiz/view/34893/Matt-s-secret-hotel-name/.
70 Cheryl Cole Using A False Name During LA Visit, OMGMUSIC.COM (Aug. 1, 2010,
1:08:00 PM), http://www.omgmusic.com/news/cheryl-cole-using-a-false-name-during-lavisit.
71 Indeed, our culture and literature is full of examples where people flee to a hotel to
hide from bad guys. Two recent, if not particularly quality examples, include the movies
COP-OUT (Warner Bros. 2010) and THE BOUNTY HUNTER (Columbia Pictures 2010).
Aliases are also a part of American history. A.K. SANDOVAL-STRAUSZ, HOTEL: AN
AMERICAN HISTORY 222 (Yale Univ. Press 2007) (noting use of aliases in nineteenth
century American hotel registrations, specifically use by a slave escaping to the north).
72 The Sixth Circuit explained:
This court explicitly rejected the principle that criminality
undermines privacy expectations in United States v. Washington,
holding [that] the notion that drug use or illegal activity eviscerates
any right to challenge a search cannot possibly be sustained. A
criminal may assert a violation of the Fourth Amendment just as well
as a saint. At oral argument, the government suggested that society
accepts a celebrity’s hotel registration under an assumed name to
avoid the paparazzi, but insisted that society would reject the
Domenech brothers’ use of an alias because it hides their illegal
activity. Yet Washington holds that “the use of a space for illegal
activity does not alter the privacy expectations of a person who
would otherwise have” a reasonable expectation.
United States v. Domenech, 623 F.3d 325, 329 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
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C. Guests of Guests: Connection and Purpose
Even where a room is validly registered, the situation can become
complicated when the hotel’s guest invites his or her own guest into the
room, whether or not prohibited by hotel policy. The Supreme Court has
provided a little guidance on when an individual can claim an
expectation of privacy in the home of another. Specifically, “an
overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth
Amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of the
householder may not.”73 In Minnesota v. Carter, the court rejected an
expectation of privacy for individuals who were in a home temporarily to
process drugs: “Respondents here were obviously not overnight guests,
but were essentially present for a business transaction and were only in
the home a matter of hours.”74
Applying those principles to the hotel room context, overnight
guests of the primary (or registered) guest have standing.75 Conversely,
casual visitors do not have an expectation of privacy.76 Thus, where a
room is rented to facilitate a drug transaction, and the defendant is in the
room “momentarily” for the “sole purpose of conducting an illegal
transaction,” he cannot “invoke the protections of the Fourth
Amendment.”77 Similarly, the employees or guests of a legitimate
business using a hotel room for a meeting, rather than for lodging, would
not possess an expectation of privacy.78 When the room does not belong
73 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998). The emphasis on “overnight” should
be understood to refer to one who is using a place as lodging, whether it is the primary
guest or a guest of the guest. Certainly a third-shift worker who sleeps during the day
and works at night would not lose an expectation of privacy by virtue of his or her
occupation if hotel management were willing to accommodate an “overday” guest. In
fact, this author once negotiated to rent a hotel room for a non-traditional period (for a
day rather than a night) next to an airport to fit in sleep during a difficult schedule.
74 Id. at 90.
75 People v. Olson, 556 N.E.2d 273, 277 (Ill. App. 1990) (relying on Minnesota v.
Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990)).
76 United States v. Masi, No. 96-4673, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 3069, at *11 (4th Cir.
Feb. 24 1998) (per curium) (“[A] mere casual visitor . . . cannot invoke the protections of
the Fourth Amendment”); United States v. Maddox, 944 F.2d 1223, 1234 (6th Cir. 1991)
(holding that a “purely transient party guest” had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
his host’s home); United States v. Grandstaff, 813 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1987)
(holding that “mere presence in the hotel room of another is not enough” to establish a
legitimate expectation of privacy in one’s surroundings); Floyd v. State, 516 S.E.2d 96,
97–98 (Ga. Ct. App 1999) (holding that a transient visitor “does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the premises of another”).
77 Masi, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 3069, at *10–11 (per curium).
78 For example, the University of Michigan Law School has historically drawn so
many interested employers that it holds its “on campus interviews” in hotel rooms at a
nearby hotel. See University of Michigan Office of Career Services 2010-11 Interview
Program, available at http://www.law.umich.edu/currentstudents/careerservices/
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to the defendant seeking to object to the search, courts investigate the
defendant’s relationship with the room.79
In addition to the registration issues in Domenech, both brothers
were arrested in one brother’s room,80 creating a question as to whether
the guest-of-a-de facto-hotel-guest could challenge a search of the room.
The court applied Sixth Circuit case law that permitted non-overnight
guests to claim an expectation of privacy in a residence: “Alejandro
[Domenech] clearly demonstrated a meaningful relationship to his
brother’s room: he paid for the room, had his personal belongings in the
room, and held the room key in his pocket.”81 Thus, the court concluded
that that the defendant “legitimately regarded [the room] as his
temporary residence.”82 Other courts have looked to those same factors
in determining whether a guest had an expectation of privacy.83 Thus,
defendants who do not have a key to the room, keep any luggage in the
room, or pay the bill, lack an expectation.84 These features help a court
to determine the defendant’s relationship with a room.85
The primary issue is whether the defendant legitimately sees the
room as a temporary residence and, if not, whether some substantial
relationship creates an expectation of privacy.86 While in most
situations, such as a prostitute temporarily visiting a room to “turn a
trick” or a commercial visitor using the room to process drugs, the result
is obvious under current precedent—the temporary visitors lack an

employerresources/Documents/EarlyInterviewWeek2010.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2011).
The students visiting these hotel rooms do not plan on using them as their temporary
abode and do not have a close relationship to the room.
79 See United States v. Domenech, 623 F.3d 325, 331 (6th Cir. 2010).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 United States v. Masi, No. 96-4673, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 3069, at *10 (4th Cir.
Feb. 24 1998) (per curium) (defendant that did not stay overnight, did not plan to stay
overnight, did not have any luggage, and did not pay a portion of the rental bill did not
have standing); United States v. Wai-Keung, 845 F. Supp. 1548, 1562 (S.D. Fla. 1994)
(registration, keeping belongings in the room, and paying for the room are factors in
determining whether an expectation of privacy exists) (citing United States v. Carter, 854
F.2d 1102, 1105–06 (8th Cir. 1988) for the proposition that “whether defendant checked
into, kept personal belongings in, and paid for room are factors in determining
expectation of privacy”); Smith v. State, 663 S.E.2d 142, 147 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)
(person who was not a registered guest, had no key, and no luggage in the room had no
expectation of privacy).
84 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
85 See, e.g., State v. Belisle, 127 P.3d 1034, at *3 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006) (table) (“In
Kansas, a person cannot establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel or motel
room which is registered to another person, absent a showing of a relationship with the
registered guest.”).
86 Domenech, 623 F.3d at 331.
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expectation of privacy. It gets more complicated if the prostitute stays
But in complicated situations, courts should apply the
overnight.87
Fourth Amendment in a manner which follows cases involving other
types of residences—for example, cases addressing the expectation of
privacy held by “non-overnight guests who are permitted to keep items
in the residence.”88 In such a context, there is no reason to treat hotel
rooms any differently. Hotel rooms do pose a distinct problem when
guests stay beyond the rental period.
D. Late Checkout: Expiration of the Rental Period
A defendant who stays or keeps possessions in a room beyond the
hotel’s checkout time can lose his expectation of privacy.89 The Fourth
Circuit explained that generally, “a guest does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his hotel room after his rental period has
terminated.”90 This is a “well-established rule.”91 An expectation of
privacy becomes unreasonable because:
When the rental period has elapsed, the guest has completely lost
his right to use the room and any privacy associated with it. The manager
of the motel may then freely enter the room, rent the room to others, and
remove any belongings left in the room. These belongings may be
retained and eventually sold by the motel to pay for back rent. Since
after the rental period expires a guest has no right of privacy, there can
be no invasion thereof.92
87 The complication arises because Carter holds that a commercial visitor has no
expectation of privacy, but one who stays overnight has such an expectation of privacy.
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998). An overnight prostitute represents a
commercial visitor whose business is to stay overnight.
88 United States v. Washington, 573 F.3d 279, 283 (6th Cir. 2009).
89 United States v. Haddad, 558 F.2d 968, 975 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that a guest
has no expectation of privacy in a hotel room after checking out, whether voluntarily or
involuntarily).
90 United States v. Kitchens, 114 F.3d 29, 31 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v.
Jackson, 585 F.2d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1978)); see also United States v. Dorais, 241 F.3d
1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir. 1997)
(stating that no legitimate expectation of privacy in a hotel room exists after rental period
has expired); United States v. Huffhines, 967 F.2d 314, 318 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that
no violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred when a search took place after the motel
had repossessed the room for nonpayment of rent)); United States v. Rahme, 813 F.2d 31,
34 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[W]hen a hotel guest’s rental period has expired or been lawfully
terminated, the guest does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the hotel
room . . . .”); United States v. Larson, 760 F.2d 852, 855 (8th Cir. 1984).
91 United States v. Singleton, 922 F. Supp. 1522, 1527 (D. Kan. 1996) (citing
Huffhines, 967 F.2d at 318; Rahme, 813 F.2d at 34; United States v. Ramirez, 810 F.2d
1338, 1341 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Croft, 429 F.2d 884, 887 (1970)).
92 Singleton, 922 F. Supp. at 1528 (quoting Croft, 429 F.2d at 887); see also United
States v. Lee, 700 F.2d 424, 425 (10th Cir. 1983).
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Thus, “once the rental period expires, control over the room reverts
to the motel manager, and the former tenant no longer can reasonably
assert an expectation of privacy in a place from which he is being
evicted.”93 This applies even if the reason the defendant missed the
checkout time was because he was under arrest and could not pay for
another night.94
A different situation arises when the hotel tolerates late checkouts
or staying beyond the normal rental time.95 In such cases, a hotel’s
policies and customs become very important, because the
“understandings that are recognized and permitted by society”96 provide
guests with some flexibility after the checkout time. It is relatively
common for hotels to permit guests to stay beyond the normal checkout
time. For example, a hotel’s normal checkout time might be noon, but
management might nevertheless extend late checkout privileges until
3:00 pm as a courtesy to guests who request it.97 When a hotel has
regularly permitted a guest to stay beyond the checkout time on prior
occasions, a guest may reasonably expect privacy after the normal
checkout time.98 In Dorais¸ the defendant “proved that the hotel did not
enforce its check-out time strictly.” 99 Thus, “it was not normal hotel
policy to issue trespass notices to overstaying guests immediately at noon
but, rather, . . . the standard practice was to ask guests at noon when they
would be leaving.” 100 Consistent with hotel policy, a housekeeper asked
Dorais when he planned to leave, and Dorais told her that he would
remain in the room until 12:30 pm. 101 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that
his expectation of privacy extended beyond the standard 12:00 pm

93 Singleton, 922 F. Supp. at 1528 (citing United States v. Rambo, 789 F.2d 1289,
1295–96 (8th Cir. 1986)).
94 Croft, 429 F.2d at 887; United States v. Angel Reyes, 908 F.2d 281, 285–866 (8th
Cir. 1990) (relying on Croft in holding that a person had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in a bus locker after the rental period expired).
95 Dorais, 241 F.3d at 1128.
96 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
97 See, e.g., United States v. Wai-Keung, 845 F. Supp. 1548, 1555 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
98 United States v. Kitchens, 114 F.3d 29, 31 (4th Cir. 1997) (“A guest may still have
a legitimate expectation of privacy even after his rental period has terminated, if there is a
pattern or practice which would make that expectation reasonable.”); United States v.
Owens, 782 F.2d 146, 150 (10th Cir. 1986) (guest who had previously remained in his
motel room past check-out time without consequence maintained reasonable expectation
of privacy in that room).
99 Dorais, 241 F.3d at 1130.
100 Id.
101 Id.
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check-out until 12:30 pm, but did not last until 12:40 pm, when police
officers arrived at the hotel’s request to evict him.102
Similarly, when a hotel permits a guest to pay for the room late on
prior days, the expiration of the rental period does not automatically
eliminate an expectation of privacy.103 Conversely, a hotel’s harsh policy
concerning checkout times and payment will defeat the reasonableness of
a late-staying guest’s expectation.104 In other words, society does not
accept as reasonable one’s expectation of privacy in a room after a
hotel’s vigorously-enforced checkout time has past. But when a hotel
has a policy allowing late check-outs, one court has suggested that it
“may be advisable” to wait to conduct a search until after the period
expires, even if the guest did not explicitly request a late check-out.105
Of course, if a guest is gone for too long, the absence itself could
constitute abandonment, and a guest loses her expectation of privacy
after abandoning a hotel room.106 Abandonment depends on the
circumstances and is often indicated by a lack of belongings in the
room.107 But where the defendant left belongings in his room and had
established a pattern of paying next day’s rent well-after check-out time,
the Eastern District of Virginia found no abandonment when he had left
the room after check-out time without paying for the next night.108 Thus,
even with guests staying or leaving property after the check-out time, the
hotel’s actions are important in determining a Fourth Amendment
expectation of privacy.
III. REQUIRING THE OWNER TO ACT FIRST
When the hotel management validly evicts a guest on the owner’s
behalf, or solicits the involvement of the police for that purpose, the

102 Id.; see also Wai-Keung, 845 F. Supp. at 1563 (search after expiration of late
checkout period was valid).
103 United States v. Watson, 783 F. Supp. 258, 259–63 (E.D. Va. 1992).
104 United States v. Kitchens, 114 F.3d 29, 32 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he manager of the
motel testified that the motel had a strict policy regarding check out.”).
105 Wai-Keung, 845 F. Supp. at 1563 (“Even if the hotel were forced to extend late
check-out privileges for purposes of consenting to a warrantless search, which may be
advisable in order to vindicate fully guests’ Fourth Amendment rights, the search of the
rooms took place after 3:00.”).
106 Watson, 783 F. Supp. at 262; Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960)
(hotel had exclusive right to possession of hotel room where petitioner had abandoned the
room by paying his bill and vacating the room).
107 See Wai-Keung, 845 F. Supp at 1563 (“[T]he lack of any personal belongings in
any of the rooms . . . bolsters the finding of abandonment.” (citation omitted)).
108 Watson, 783 F. Supp. at 259.
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guest loses any expectation of privacy.109 But before a guest loses his or
her privacy expectations, the hotel itself must act. The Ninth Circuit
explains that “a defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in a
hotel room when the rental period has expired and the hotel has taken
affirmative steps to repossess the room.”110 Thus, “the mere expiration
of the rental period, in the absence of affirmative acts of repossession by
the lessor, does not automatically end a lessee’s expectations of
privacy.”111
This rule does not require the hotel manager to personally respond
to a problem with the guest; it only requires the police act (at least in
part) on the manager’s behalf, which appears to be a relatively common
occurrence.112 Domenech applied this rule in holding that false
registration was an issue for the management.113 Courts have recognized
that managers actually do involve the police to effectuate an eviction for
false registration.114 Similarly, other violations of hotel policy—having
too many individuals in the room, allowing an unregistered guest to stay
over, using the room for an illicit purpose, etc.—are issues for
management first.
The case of a fraudulently-obtained room—where a guest used a
fake credit card, for example – is more difficult because the hotel’s
permission was premised on the lie. Here too the hotel-acts-first rule
makes sense. The Ninth Circuit held that the occupant who fraudulently
obtained a hotel room maintained an expectation of privacy until the
hotel took affirmative steps to repossess the room.115 Indeed, a district
court in Florida stated that once a hotel found out “that the rooms were
guaranteed with a fraudulent credit card, it had every right to terminate
the occupancy of the rooms occupied by the defendants.”116

109 United States v. Dorais, 241 F.3d 1124, 1128–29 (9th Cir. 2001) (defendant has no
expectation of privacy in a room that he has been legally ejected from); United States v.
Singleton, 922 F. Supp. 1522, 1528 (D. Kan. 1996).
110 Dorais, 241 F.3d at 1128 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Huffhines, 967
F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1992)).
111 Id. at 1129.
112 See, e.g., United States v. Kitchens, 114 F.3d 29, 31 (4th Cir. 1997) (officers acting
with consent of the manager); Carter v. State, 72 P.3d 1256 (Alaska App. 2003) (hotel
acted first); Sumdum v. State, 612 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Alaska 1980) (desk clerk entered
room after normal check-out time with police at her side).
113 United States v. Domenech, 623 F.3d 325, 330 (6th Cir. 2010).
114 See United States v. McConnell, 903 F.2d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1990) (hotel evicting
defendant for registering under false name).
115 United States v. Cunag, 386 F.3d 888, 895 (9th Cir. 2004).
116 United States v. Wai-Keung, 845 F. Supp. 1548, 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (citing FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 509.402 (West 1988)).
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Some courts refuse to recognize any expectation of privacy in a
room obtained by fraud, comparing it to possessing a stolen car.117 A
stolen car is the wrong analogy for an improperly-obtained hotel room,
which should be analyzed as an improperly-obtained residence. If a
defendant committed mortgage fraud, or rented an apartment but wrote a
bad check at move-in, society would not treat the resident’s privacy in
the home the same as a car-thief.118 The difference is that the resident
entered the property with permission—permission that can rightfully be
revoked. The lessor or hotel owner might want to try to collect the
money due and leave the tenant in place, whereas the automobile owner
just wants his or her car back. Similarly, a guest obtaining a hotel room
by fraud should not be regarded as a squatter lacking any rights because
the guest entered with permission, although one who simply takes over a
room should be treated like all other squatters.119
Requiring hotel management to act first is consistent with how
Fourth Amendment law is applied to other types of residences.120
Moreover, it prevents law enforcement officers from using an
unlawfully-obtained room as an after-the-fact justification for an illegal
search. Most importantly, this rule fits with the “understandings that are
recognized and permitted by society.”121 Generally, we expect to be left
alone in a hotel room. If we violate a hotel policy, we expect that the
owner or her agents will throw us out. Even if management might call
the cops to throw us out, our relationship is with the hotel and our
violation of hotel rules affects the hotel first and foremost.

117

State v. Delvechio, 687 S.E.2d 845, 848 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
See United States v. Jeter, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1343–44 (D. Utah 2005)
(discussing problem with government’s argument that violations eliminate expectation of
privacy).
119 Squatters lack an expectation of privacy. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Bishop Estate,
25 F.3d 784 (9th Cir. 1994) (squatters and their guest lacked “objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy” in another’s property and consequently were precluded from
claiming search of shack on property violated Fourth Amendment); United States v.
Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471, 1472–74 (10th Cir. 1986) (squatter lacked privacy expectation
to challenge search of cave in which he resided on federal land in Utah); Amezquita v.
Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 11–12 (1st Cir. 1975) (squatters on farmland owned by
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico lacked Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of
privacy to support injunction protecting their homes).
120 See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 573 F.3d 279, 284–85 (6th Cir. 2009)
(apartment tenant in violation of lease maintained expectation of privacy because
landlord did not evict him); United States v. McClendon, 86 F. App’x 92, 95–96 (6th Cir.
2004) (invalid sublet in violation of lease insufficient to render expectation
unreasonable); United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir. 1997) (occupant with
insufficient funds possessed expectation of privacy until locked out).
121 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
118
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IV. CONCLUSION
Although the possible permutations are as diverse as America’s
hotels and motels, the Fourth Amendment’s treatment of hotel rooms
does not need to be overly complex. Applying the precedents from other
residential situations will ensure that the court’s determination of what
society reasonably expects, and what society actually expects, will be
more in line with each other. The rule that best fits this is to require the
hotel to undertake some affirmative action in enforcing its own
policies—and if there is a close call, to err on the side of requiring the
hotel to act first, before extinguishing an enforceable right to privacy.
The Tenth Circuit should repudiate its dicta from Carr and accept the
apparent majority rule—that without a warrant, exigent circumstances, or
a management effort to evict, the Fourth Amendment tells police: Do Not
Disturb.

